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Abstract 
Objectives: Biased thinking (to some extent overlapping with the concepts of cognitive 
distortions and cognitive errors) is a key-concept in cognitive therapy of Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD). Specific contents and cognitive processes related to BPD 
functioning are known. However, most studies are based on self-report measures which 
present a number of important limitations, in particular the difficulty in assessing non-
conscious processes infused by affect. So far, no studies were conducted using valid observer-
rated methodology addressing the question of biased thinking in BPD as it unfolds 
spontaneously in session.  
Design: This is a controlled interview study comparing two matched groups, BPD patients 
and healthy controls. 
Methods: A total of N = 25 clinical dynamic interviews with patients presenting with BPD 
were transcribed and rated using the Cognitive Errors Rating Scale (Drapeau, Perry, & 
Dunkley, 2008); their cognitive profiles were compared to those of N = 25 healthy controls 
who underwent the same procedure.  
Results: Overall, results indicated that no between-group difference in the frequency of 
specific biases was found. However, heightened levels of negative cognitive biases, in 
particular over-generalizing and fortune-telling, were associated with BPD. Furthermore, 
negative over-generalizing was associated with the number of BPD symptoms.  
Conclusions: These results have high levels of ecological validity and are promising for the 
refinement of cognitive theory of Borderline Personality Disorder. Clinical implications for 
assessment and intervention are discussed. 
 
Key-Words: Biased Thinking; Cognitive Errors; Cognitive Distortions; Borderline Personality 
Disorder; Observer-Rated Methodology 
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BIASED THINKING ASSESSED BY EXTERNAL OBSERVERS IN BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY DISORDER 
Introduction 
Biased thinking, in more specific works also referred to as cognitive distortions and 
sometimes cognitive errors, is important within the theoretical framework of cognitive 
therapy (Beck, 1963; Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1990; J. Beck, 1995; Young, 1990; see also 
Arntz & van Genderen, 2009). The status of logic in biased thinking is discussed 
controversially. From the perspective of cognitive therapy, logical errors are associated with 
psychopathology and need to be treated beforehand (Beck et al., 1990; Young, 1990). 
However, from the perspective of research on heuristics (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2011), it 
must be noted that under certain circumstances biased thinking may produce adaptive 
behavior. To some extent, cognitive biases are part of adaptive human functioning (see also 
Baron, 2008; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Gilbert, 1998). In order to remain as descriptive as 
possible in what follows, we choose the term of biased thinking, even if the notions of 
cognitive errors and cognitive distortions may be used as well, albeit always keeping in mind 
the afore-mentioned criticisms. The latter calls for specific process-based assessment of 
biased thinking. 
Extensive research has been conducted on distorted thinking in mood disorders, such 
as major depression (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). However, little is known for Personality 
Disorders (PD), in particular Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD; Arntz, 2005). Beck and 
colleagues (1990) postulated that the suffering of patients with PD is maintained by a set of 
specific cognitive errors, that are characterized by inaccuracy in interpreting the surrounding 
world or interpersonal relationships (Arntz, 1994; Barnow, Stopsack, Grabe, Meinke, Spitzer, 
Kronmüller, & Sieswerda, 2009). Biases in perception and assessment may result in 
shortcomings in interpretative functioning, which in turn may be indicative of underlying 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 4 
schemas. For example, patients with BPD could have as many as nine (out of a complete list 
of 18 categorical formulations; according to Young, described in Beck et al., 1990) so-called 
early maladaptive schemas. Arntz (2004; see also Pretzer, 1990) assumed that three basic 
schemas may be found in patients with BPD: (1) „The world is/Others are dangerous and 
malevolent“, (2) „I am powerless and vulnerable“, and (3) „I am inherently bad and 
unacceptable“. In order to test these assumptions, research relevant for biased thinking 
associated with BPD have taken two partially overlapping perspectives: (a) focusing on the 
contents of the cognitive schemas and the representational structures of patients presenting 
with BPD, and (b) focusing on the processes of biased cognitive activity, by measuring any of 
the basic cognitive distortions, e.g., dichotomous thinking, as defined by Beck (1963; Pretzer, 
1990). 
Contents of biased thinking in BPD 
Arntz’s (1994) and Pretzer’s (1990) assumptions were tested in a comparative study  
(Arntz, Dietzel, & Dreessen, 1999) including patients with BPD, patients with any Cluster C 
PD and a control group, by constructing a scale (Personality Disorder Belief Questionnaire; 
PDBQ) representing a set of 20 BPD-specific assumptions about the world and interaction 
partners. Results showed high specificity of the presumed BPD related assumptions in the 
patients with BPD, especially after controlling for the Cluster C diagnosis, with excellent 
internal consistency. The themes of these items include (Arntz et al., 1999, p. 555), among 
others, loneliness, emptiness, lack of personal control, abandonment, dependency on others, 
self-criticism, badness, mistrust, helplessness, powerlessness and self-punishment. From the 
perspective of Beck’s list of cognitive errors in information-processing, several items may 
imply cognitive errors: „I will never get what I want“ may be underpinned by the process of 
fortune-telling or „I will always be alone“ may be rated on the process-level as over-
generalizing (see for the items: Arntz et al., 1999). Only negatively valenced contents are 
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reported in the item-list. These BPD-related assumptions seem to be stable over experimental 
conditions, independent from manipulation of emotion-induction (Arntz et al., 1999). Similar 
themes were found in a study using a different questionnaire measuring dysfunctional beliefs 
in BPD (Butler, Brown, Beck, & Grisham, 2002), which also confirmed a BPD specificity in 
terms of cognitive themes. The world views of patients with BPD were examined by Giesen-
Bloo and Arntz (2005). Results showed the presence of perceptions of the world as a 
malevolent and unlucky place, along with low self-worth. These themes were associated with 
BPD, but not with the presence of trauma in the anamnesis of the patient. Finally, a large-
scale questionnaire study on N = 643 subjects, of whom many had a PD (with some BPD) 
diagnosis, showed a similar pattern, even though the cognitive themes, as measured by the 
PDBQ (Personality Disorder Belief Scale), predicted PD only sub-optimally (Arntz, Dreessen, 
Schouten, & Weertman, 2004). This last result may be interpreted as suggesting that PDs 
were not only determined by the content of the cognitive beliefs, but also by additional 
variables, such as the processes of baised thinking. 
Processes of biased thinking in BPD 
The process-perspective on biased thinking focuses on disturbances in information 
processing, i.e., cognitive errors and overall cognitive negativity, rather than, as shown before, 
on the specific themes associated with BPD. Several studies have investigated dichotomous 
thinking, or all-or-nothing thinking, postulated to be a cognitive error in the information 
processing of patients with BPD when confronted with emotion-eliciting contents (Arntz, 
1994; Layden, Newman, Freeman, & Byers Morse, 1993; Oshio, 2009). In two experimental 
studies (Veen & Arntz, 2000; Napolitano & McKay, 2007), dichotomous thinking was 
associated with BPD, when facing film clips implying BPD-specific themes (i.e., 
abandonment, abuse), compared with patients presenting other PDs, versus healthy controls. 
Whereas Veen and Arntz (2000), who used a open response-format, found a clear specificity 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 6 
in BPD for dichotomous thinking, this was not the case in the second study by Napolitano and 
McKay (2007), despite similar methodology. Moreover, dichotomous thinking was found not 
to be limited to one single dimension, usually named «good/bad», but the results suggested 
that BPD patients were able to make extreme judgments of the same person on various 
dimensions simultaneously, such as reliability/unreliability, loveability/unloveability and so 
forth. These studies are particularly relevant, as they do not only rely on self-report measures 
prone to methodological biases. However, the ecological validity of the experimental 
approach may be questioned, in particular the generalizing of the results to clinical, even more 
unstructured, settings. 
Cognitive biases towards negativity were shown in several additional studies. Barnow, 
Stopsack, Grabe, Meinke, Spitzer, Kronmüller, and Sieswerda (2009) have shown that 
patients with BPD tend to judge others more negatively and aggressively (in addition to less 
positively), when compared to controls. This difference was also significant when comparing 
the judgments of BPD patients with those of depressed individuals. Similar findings were 
reported by Arntz and Veen (2001) on a sample of N = 16 patients with BPD, compared to 
Cluster C PDs and healthy controls. These results are consistent with the ones reported by 
Kurtz and Morey (1998). More generally, negatively valenced thoughts have a more 
important functional impact on symptom level and are more prone to change over the course 
of therapy, compared to positively valenced errors (Schwartz, 1986). Further empirical 
findings on the role and function of positive cognitive errors in severe psychiatric disorders 
may be found in Kramer and Drapeau (2009) and Kramer, Bodenmann and Drapeau (2009). 
Finally, we should mention several other studies realized from different conceptual 
viewpoints (e.g., psychodynamic, Westen, Lohr, Silk, Gold, & Kerber, 2010, and 
interpersonal, e.g., Ghiassi, Dimaggio, & Brüne, 2010) which put forward specific socio-
cognitive dysfunctions in patients presenting with BPD partially overlapping with the afore-
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mentioned. From the research perspective on heuristics cited above, Dimaggio et al. (2008) 
hypothesized several specific heuristics to be associated with BPD, for instance „better safe 
than sorry“ meaning that the reasoning is characterized by the overestimation of an 
anticipated danger leading to not choosing to take that limited risk („safe“), while at the same 
time discarding the possibility of negative consequences (i.e., impossibility of goal-
attainment) in case of not choosing to take that limited risk. This strategy might explain 
paranoid states on BPD. Another heuristic of relevance for BPD might be the self-
enhancement strategies, also associated with narcissistic functioning (Dimaggio et al., 2008). 
Finally, limited anticipation of satisfaction, recurrent interpersonal reassurance seeking and 
limited joy in case of gains are some other cited heuristics associated with BPD (Leahy, 
2002). So far, these assumptions on maladaptive heuristics related to BPD have not been 
tested empirically. 
It needs to be acknowledged that cognitive processes are not fully accessible to an 
individual’s awareness: most of them are implicit or automatic cognitive processes (Johnson-
Laird, Mancini, & Gangemi, 2006), in particular from the perspective of the criticisms 
addressed at cognitive theory: heuristics may be understood as unconscious strategies, infused 
by affective and socio-emotional components (e.g., Bower, 1981; Domes, Czieschnek, 
Weidler, Berger, Fast, & Herpertz, 2008; Downey, Berenson, Rafaeli, Coifman, & Leventhal, 
2011; Minzenberg, Poole, & Vinogradov, 2006) which has implications for assessment 
strategies, in particular, the questionable use of self-report questionnaire to tap into cognitive 
processes. Biases of social desirability, or acquiescence and self-deception need to be 
acknowledged. Glass and Arnkoff (1997) pointed out that item endorsement in a self-report 
questionnaire may represent, in addition to the measured construct, conceptually unrelated 
constructs, such as the personal relevance of the item to the subject, the subject’s motivation 
to respond or the degree of awareness of a process. This problem may result in uneven prime 
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specificity associated with each item of the questionnaire. This set of criticisms also apply to 
the scales measuring cognitive distortions using a questionnaire-approach (Najavits, 
Gotthardt, Weiss, & Epstein, 2004; Oshio, 2009; Renneberg, Schmidt-Rathjens, Hippin, 
Backenstrauss, & Fydrich, 2005). D’Iuso, Blake, Fitzpatrick, and Drapeau (2009) underlined 
that a self-report assesses the representation a person has of his/her own processes, and fails to 
assess the processes themselves, as they may occur in a spontaneous speech production (see 
also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
The aim of the present study was to apply a valid oberver-rated system of cognitive 
errors from the process-perspective to standardized clinical interviews eliciting relevant 
schemas conducted with patients presenting Borderline Personality Disorder and to compare 
their cognitive error profiles with the ones of matched healthy controls. This methodology 
reponds to the criticism addressed to the questionnaire-approach and ensures high levels of 
ecological validity. Our hypotheses were as follows: (1) More cognitive errors (overall score) 
are produced by patients with BPD in the in-session spontaneous verbal report, compared to 
non-clinical controls; (2) More specifically, more negatively valenced errors are produced by 
patients with BPD in the in-session spontaneous verbal report, compared to non-clinical 
controls; (3) There is a correlation between the frequencies of cognitive errors and symptoms 
in BPD patients. 
Method 
Sample 
A total of 25 outpatients presenting with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) were 
included in the study. A total of 15 (60%) were female; the patients had a mean age of 31.1 
years (SD = 10.4; ranging from 19 to 55). All patients were french-speaking and had a DSM-
IV (APA, 1994) diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder, as diagnosed by the treating 
clinician using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-II; First, Spitzer, 
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Williams, & Gibbons, 2004). Mean number of BPD criteria met was 6.96 (SD = 1.43; ranging 
between 5 and 9). Other axis II –diagnoses included paranoid PD (1 patient) and narcissistic 
PD (1 patient); on average, the patients had 1.08 diagnoses on axis II. Reliability of axis II 
diagnoses was satisfactory (ĸ = .76); these analyses were performed on independent ratings 
done by a trained researcher of video-taped SCID-II interviews on randomly chosen 20% (5) 
of all cases; inter-rater reliability was performed taking into account all items of the SCID-II. 
Some of the patients (10; 40%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as major depression (4 
patients; 16%), agoraphobia (1 patient), dysthymia (1 patient), bulimia (1 patient), anorexia (1 
patient), panic disorder (1 patient), alcohol abuse (1 patient), somatoform disorder (1 patient), 
schizoaffective disorder (1 patient); on average, the patients had 0.42 diagnoses on axis I. 
Axis I-diagnoses were obtained using the MINI (Lecrubier et al., 1997), on which no 
reliability checks were performed. Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of 
the total number of years of education. On average, the patients had 13.2 years of education in 
any field (SD = 1.3; range from 10 to 17). The rather low levels of co-morbidity was probably 
due to the highly specialized center in which the study took place; as a principle, only patients 
with predominant axis-II disorder were accepted for treatment, which resulted in particular in 
relatively low levels of depression. Treatment encompassed weekly psychiatric treatment 
according to Gunderson and Links (2008; see also Kramer, Berger, Kolly, Marquet, Preisig, 
de Roten, Despland, & Caspar, 2011). 
A strictly matched control group was recruited; matching criteria were gender, socio-
demographic level and age, as these have an influence on cognitive functioning (Labouvie-
Vief, Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of N = 25 individuals from a 
french-speaking community sample participated in the study. Out of these, 15 (60%) were 
female; the controls had a mean age of 33.7 (SD = 7.9 ; range from 23 to 50) and a mean 
number of years of education of 12.9 (SD = 1.2; range from 11 to 17). Thus, no difference 
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was found with regard to the matching criteria (for age: t(1, 48) = -1.06; p = .30; for socio-
demographic level: t(1, 48) = -1.44; p = .39). Neither life-time inpatient treatment in 
psychiatry, nor current pharmacological nor behavioral intervention is known for these 
participants. General symptomatology was in the normal range for all control participants 
(using the SCL-90-R; see below), according to the clinical cut-offs (M = .47; SD = .23; 
ranging from .18 to .89). All participants gave written informed consent. The study was 
approved by the Research Ethics Board of the specific institutions. 
Instruments 
Cognitive Errors Rating System (CERS; Drapeau, Perry, & Dunkley, 2008; French 
translation and validation by Kramer & Drapeau, 2011). The CERS is an observer-rating 
system assessing cognitive errors in interview transcripts. It evaluates 15 different cognitive 
errors, based on J. Beck (1995) and A. T. Beck (1963): (1) Fortune-telling, (2) Labeling, (3) 
Over-generalizing, (4) All-or-nothing, (5) Discounting the positive/negative, (6) Emotional 
reasoning, (7) Magnification/minimization of positive/negative, (8) Mental filter, (9) Should 
and must, (10) Tunnel vision, (11) Jumping to conclusions, (12) Mind-reading, (13) 
Personalization, (14) Inappropriate blaming of self, and (15) Inappropriate blaming of others. 
All errors are broken down according to their valence: positive and negative. According to 
Lefebvre (1981), they can be classified in four higher-order categories: fortune-telling (error 
1), overgeneralizing (errors 2 and 3), selective abstraction (errors 4 through 11), 
personalization (errors 12 through 15). For all computations, relative frequencies are used, by 
weighting the absolute frequency of each error by the number of words emitted by the patient 
(excluding therapist interventions and patient’s hesitations) yielding a score for each error per 
1000 words. Empirical validation data have been presented in several studies, accounting for 
sufficient internal and external validity (D’Iuso, Blake, Fitzpatrick, & Drapeau, 2009) for the 
original English version and for the French version used in this study (Kramer, Bodenmann, 
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& Drapeau, 2009; Kramer & Drapeau, 2011; Kramer, de Roten, & Drapeau, 2011). A manual 
(Drapeau, Perry, & Dunkley, 2008) guides the rater, in order to assure high quality ratings. 
For instance, in order to be able to identify a CE on a specific transcript excerpt, the manual 
prescribes the necessity of external evidence which must be found elsewhere in the same 
session, e.g., over-generalizing at one point in the transcript must be accompanied by 
information – to be found elsewhere in the transcript - about the presumed external evidence 
related to the content of the over-generalizing statement. For the current study, reliability 
coefficients on 20% of the ratings are established among trained raters and yield satisfactory 
results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC(2, 1); Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) 
varying between .72 and .92 (M = .83; SD = .07). These coefficients are established on error 
category as the unit of analysis (15 categories); in order to save power, for the presentation of 
the results, only the four higher-order categories, broken down into both valences, are taken 
into account. 
Outcome Questionnaire-45.2 (OQ-45.; Lambert, et al., 1996). This self-report 
questionnaire encompasses 45 items addressing three main domains of distress: level of 
symptoms, interpersonal relations and social role. A general sum score was computed which 
was used in this study. A Likert-type scale is used to assess the items, from 0 (never) to 4 
(almost all the times). Validation coeffients of the original English version are satisfactory, in 
particular for internal consistency and sensitivity to change over psychotherapeutic treatment 
(Vermeersch, Lambert, & Burlingame, 2000). A French validation study (for the version used 
in this study) was carried out by Emond, Savard, Lalande, Boisvert, Boutin, and Simard 
(2004) and yielded satisfactory results. Cronbach’s alpha for this sample was .95. Only the 
BPD patients filled out this questionnaire. 
Symptom Check List (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
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using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the Global Severity Index (GSI, score ranging 
from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. The 
French validation study was carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded satisfactory 
coefficients. Cronbach’s alpha for this sample was .98. Only the controls filled out this 
questionnaire. 
Procedure 
All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (DI; Perry, 
Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. As shown by Perry, Fowler, and Semeniuk 
(2005), high-quality dynamic interviews were associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). On a technical level, focus of the DI was 
the «patient’s life in general» and five tasks of the interviewer composed the I-DIA: (1) 
Setting the interview frame: work-enhancing strategies; (2) Offering support: questions, 
support strategies, associations; (3) Affect exploration: questions, reflections, clarifications, 
defense interpretations; (4) Trial interpretations: defense and transference interpretations; (5) 
Formulating a synthesis. DI as a research tool has been developed from clinical practice of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of DI is comparable to the context of an 
intake psychotherapy interview which was the case in our study: all patients came to the 
outpatient clinic with a request for psychotherapy for problems related to BPD. The 
techniques involved in the DI, in particular affect exploration, interpretations and formulation 
of synthesis, were prone to activate relevant schemas, as they had a fairly confronting value 
for the patient. Thus, this interview format, due to its schema-activating techniques, was 
relevant for assessment of spontaneous cognitive processes and ensured high levels of 
ecological validity (Kramer, Bodenmann, & Drapeau, 2009; D’Iuso et al., 2009). Validity 
coefficients of the DI with a healthy control group and for assessment of cognitive errors were 
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provided by Kramer and Drapeau (in press). The DIs were conducted by trained clinicians 
who had over 3 years of clinical experience and had specific initial training in DI. 
The patients were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked 
to fill them in right after the session.  
 The control group was recruited by means of advertisement at two local institutions: 
(1) School of Social Studies (n = 16); (2) Association promoting Community Activities and 
Service (n = 9). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control group 
recruitment. Therefore, only nine participants had to be refused participation due to the failure 
to meet the matching criteria. Only the control participants were given a financial 
compensation (the equivalent of USD 20). Due to our focus on the process-level using the 
CERS, we assumed comparability between the different interview contexts. 
 All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology 
students, according to the method defined by Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated based on the transcripts. All ratings were done by four Master’s-
Level students in psychology; reliability of these ratings was established with trained raters on 
a randomly chosen 20% of all interviews (for the results see under Instruments). 
Data Analytic Strategy 
In preliminary analyses, we tested the comparability on the process-level of the two 
interview contexts (patients and healthy controls), by using between-group comparison 
(ANOVA) of number of words emitted by the individual. Univariate and multivariate 
statistics were performed to test our first hypothesis. Pearson’s correlations were carried out 
in order to test the relationship between errors, BPD-criteria and symptoms.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses comparing the mean number of words yielded a between-group 
difference: the BPD patients produced on average 4470 words (SD = 1056) during the 
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dynamic interview setting, which was less than the controls who produced on average 7766 
words (SD = 2514) in the same setting. This difference in number of words was significant 
(F(1, 49) = 36.52; p < .001). As independent clinical anchor, Kramer, Bodenmann, and 
Drapeau (2009) have found in a comparable interview study on bipolar disorder the mean 
production of 5037 (4418 respectively) words for patients presenting with clinical depression. 
Given the significant between-group difference in our data, along with the comparable means 
with other clinical populations, it was meaningful to pursue all remaining statistical analyses 
only on relative frequencies of CEs, weighted by the number of words produced per 1000. 
Univariate analyses yielded no significant between-group effect for the number of 
errors, even if a medium effect size of d = .50 was observed (see table 1). However, a 
between-group difference was found for the total of negative cognitive errors; patients 
produced more of these, compared to controls (p = .03), whereas no effect was found for the 
total positive errors (p = .41).  
Multivariate statistics (MANOVA) on all the eight categories of errors (the four 
clusters broken down into positive vs negative valence) yielded an overall multivariate effect 
(p = .01; see table 1). More specifically, two clusters with negative valence showed 
significant differences: BPD patients produced more negative fortune-telling and over-
generalizing, compared to controls. On the other hand, BPD patients produced less positive 
over-generalizing than controls. No other significant differences were found. 
Finally, Pearson’s correlation analyses showed no significant correlation between the 
level of general symptoms (sum score of OQ-45) and the weighted frequencies of cognitive 
errors (see table 2). In order to test if the level of general symptoms had an influence on the 
between-group differences, as tested above, we conducted ANCOVA controlling for the sum 
score of OQ-45; as expected, results from these analyses were comparable to the ones 
reported in table 1. However, the number of BPD criteria met, as assessed using the SCID-II, 
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correlated with one category of weighted frequencies of CE: negative over-generalizing (r = 
.41; see table 2). 
Discussion 
Our hypotheses were partially supported by the results. The first hypothesis 
postulating higher levels of cognitive biases, as measured on the process-level of the 
spontaneous in-session speech production, associated with BPD, compared to healthy controls 
was not confirmed by the results; similar frequencies of CEs were found. This result may 
surprise, but is in line with research associated with the heuristics paradigm, in the form of 
unjustified optimism in the healthy controls (Baron, 2008; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 1990). 
Thus, we may note that the absence of the main effect may reflect what Gigerenzer and 
Brighton (2011, p. 3) summarized as, regarding healthy persons, “people violate a law of 
logic, probability, or some other standard of rationality” (see also Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). The second hypothesis was partially supported: more negative cognitive errors, in 
particular fortune-telling and over-generalizing, were found to be associated with BPD, 
compared to healthy controls, along with lower levels of positive over-generalizing in BPD. 
Negative over-generalizing was also linked with BPD symptomatology (see hypothesis 3). 
Cognitive biases towards negativity on the process-level was reported to be linked with BPD 
(Arntz & Veen, 2001; Barnow et al., 2009; Kurtz, & Morey, 1998). Based on our results, this 
bias may now be specified in terms of specific categories of cognitive biases, i.e., negative 
over-generalizing and fortune-telling. It is interesting to note that the selective abstraction 
category which encompasses among others dichotomous thinking, discussed as a BPD 
specificity (Napolitano & McKay, 2007; Veen & Arntz, 2000), did not present an effect in our 
study. Even if the interview technique assures individualized schema-activation, this 
particular process was not elicited more often than in controls. The structure of the CE 
instrument, the low power of the present study and possible Type II statistical errors might 
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account for the absence of effect of dichotomous thinking. Our findings put a different 
category at center stage of the BPD functioning on the process-level: over-generalizing. An 
example of negative over-generalizing may be a patient saying: “My entire life is a mess”, or 
“My father always ignored me” where the patient makes abusive generalizations (using 
typically words such as “entire”, “always”, “never” referring to generalizing) based on a fact 
that presumably only occured very rarely (the latter point implies that the CE-rating must take 
into account the contextual information of the entire transcript, for comparison with the 
assumed “reality” which constitutes an advantage of the observer-rater perspective; see under 
Instruments). We underline that the purity of our sample, in particular the low level of co-
morbid depression, allows the exclusion of confounding with depressive phenomenology, 
clinically associated with over-generalizing. The more often the patients used this cognitive 
error, the more BPD symptoms they presented: thus, negative over-generalizing may be 
discussed as specific vulnerability factor in the maintenance of BPD symptoms. Positive over-
generalizing, e.g., a patient saying “My entire childhood was a honey-moon” or “My 
boyfriend is always there when I need him”, a cognitive process which may at times serve 
tendencies of denial (Kramer & Drapeau, 2009) was less produced by BPD patients, 
compared to controls. Again, positive cognitive errors may certainly have an impact on the 
level of symptoms on the long run, but on the short-term, they are capable of producing in the 
subject a positive emotion, e.g., pride, contentment, enthusiasm in the case of our second 
example, which may serve as a protective shield towards the overall distressing experience. 
The therapeutic role of positive emotions associated with pleasurable activities is discussed by 
Linehan, Bohus, and Lynch (2007) and more generally within Dialectical-Behavior Therapy 
(Linehan, 1993).  
According to Kendall and Hollon (1981; see also Schwartz, 1986), negative cognitive 
errors are more likely to change as a result of cognitive psychotherapy, compared with 
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positive cognitive errors. Therefore, several clinical implications may ensue from the results 
found (see also Alden & Osti, 1989). Cognitive processes occur spontaneously in-session, 
consistent with the methodology used in the present study which underlines the particular 
clinical relevance of the results. The observation that negative over-generalizing is over-used 
in the in-session cognitive processes in BPD patients may be useful for clinical assessment 
and intervention. Cognitive therapists working with these patients may be more attentive to 
these processes and use these errors as hints to the underlying cognitive or affective schemas 
(Sachse et al., 2009; Young et al., 2003). Based on the example given („My father always 
ignored me“), the therapist may hypothesize the basic need of being important for the 
patient’s father was not met (Sachse et al., 2009) and the feeling of being ignored takes 
precedence over, in this example, the presumed fact that the father was also at times attentive 
and empathic towards the subject. Clarification of these schema-aspects related to this 
cognitive bias should be done on an idiosyncratic level, as well as the implementation of 
cognitive or affective restructuring techniques, e.g., by using socratic dialogue, imagery 
techniques (Young et al., 2003) or various forms of two-chair dialogues (e.g., Arntz, 2009; 
Greenberg, 2002; Sachse, Püschel, Fasbender, & Breil, 2008; Warwar, Links, Greenberg, & 
Bergmans, 2008). The latter Gestalt techniques are consistent with the notion of, described 
earlier, affect-infusion (Bower, 1981) where the aim of psychotherapy is the promotion of 
shifts in states of mind which ultimately will change biased thinking. 
We need to acknowledge several limitations of the present study. The number of 
observations is relatively small, resulting in limited power, and several research avenues open 
up based on the present pilot study. The difference found with regard to the number of words 
produced, which seem to be associated with psychopathology in two studies using the same 
methodology (the present one and Kramer, Bodenmann and Drapeau, 2009), calls for further 
investigation aiming at the understanding of this phenomenon: are patients more distressed 
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and therefore less talkative, or are healthy controls less mistrusting and produce therefore 
more words? The BPD sample presents low co-morbidity, both on axis I and II, which is 
consistent with the specialized center for BPD where the patients were recruited; however, we 
need to take great care when generalizing these results to samples with higher co-morbidity. 
Similarly, a relative high number of men (40%), rather unusual in studies on BPD, invite 
readers to be cautious when comparing our results with the literature. Matching with the 
number of years of education (instead of the intelligence itself) may have been a biased 
operationalization of cognitive capacities, in particular for this patient population for whom 
we may therefore have underestimated their cognitive capacities. Finally, no clinical control 
group was included (see Veen & Arntz, 2000; Napolitano & McKay, 2007) which should be a 
follow-up study answering the question of CE specificity of BPD, from the perspective of the 
external observers. 
References 
Alden, M., & Osti, J. (1989). Cognitive distortions in borderline personality disorder: 
Therapeutic implications. Transactional Analysis Journal, 19(1), 51-52. 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th Edition). Washington, D. C.: Author. 
Arntz, A. (1994). Treatment of borderline personality disorder: A Challenge for cognitive-
behavioural therapy. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 419-430. 
Arntz, A. (2004). Borderline personality disorder. In A. T. Beck, A. Freeman, D. Davis, & 
Associates (Eds.), Cognitive Theory of Personality Disorders (pp. 187-215). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Arntz, A. (2005). Introduction to Special Issue: Cognition and emotion in borderline 
personality disorder. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 36, 
167-172. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 19 
Arntz A., & van Genderen, H. (2009). Schema Therapy of Borderline Personality Disorder. 
New York: Wiley. 
Arntz, A., Dietzel, R., & Dreessen, L. (1999). Assumptions in borderline personality disorder: 
Specificity, stability and relationship with etiological factors. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 37, 545-557. 
Arntz, A., Dreessen, L., Schouten, E., & Weertman, A. (2004). Beliefs in personality 
disorders: A test with the Personality Disorder Belief Questionnaire. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 42, 1215-1225. 
Arntz, A., & Veen, G. (2001). Evaluations of others by borderline patients. Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 189, 513-521. 
Barnow, S., Stopsack, M., Grabe, H. J., Meinke, C., Spitzer, C., Kronmüller, K., & Sieswerda, 
S. (2009). Interpersonal evaluation bias in borderline personality disorder. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 47, 359-365. 
Baron, J. (2008). Thinking and deciding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Beck, A. T. (1963). Thinking and depression. 1. Idiosyncratic content and cognitive 
distortions. Archives of General Psychiatry, 9, 324-333. 
Beck, A. T. (1991). Cognitive therapy. A 30-year perspective. American Psychologist, 46(4), 
368-375. 
Beck, A. T., Freeman, A., Pretzer, J., Davis, D. D., Fleming, B., Ottaviani, R., Beck, J., 
Simon, K. M., Padesky, C., Meyer, J., & Trexler, L. (1990). Cognitive Therapy of 
Personality Disorders. New York: Guilford Press. 
Beck, J. S. (2005). Cognitive Therapy: Basics and Beyond. New York: Guilford Press. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 20 
Butler, A. C., Brown, G. K., Beck, A. T., & Grisham, J. R. (2002). Assessment of 
dysfunctional beliefs in borderline personality disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 40, 1231-1240. 
Clark, D. M., Beck, A. T., & Alford, B. A. (1999). Scientific Foundations of Cognitive Theory 
and Therapy of Depression. New York: John Wiley & Sons.  
Derogatis, L. R. (1994). Symptom Checklist-90-Revised: Administration scoring and 
procedures Manual (3rd Edition). Minneapolis, MN: National Computers Systems. 
Dimaggio, G., Semerari, A., Carcione, A., Procacci, M., & Nicolo, G. (2006). Toward a 
model of Self pathology underlying personality disorders : narratives, metacognition, 
interpersonal cycles and decision-making processes. Journal of Personality Disorders, 
20(6), 597-617. 
D’Iuso, E., Blake, E., Fitzpatrick, M., & Drapeau, M. (2009). Cognitive errors, coping 
patterns, and the therapeutic alliance: A pilot study of in-session process. Counselling 
and Psychotherapy Research, 9(2), 108-114. 
Domes, G., Czieschnek, D., Weidler, F., Berger, C., Fast, K., & Herpertz, S. C. (2008). 
Recognition of facial affect in borderline personality disorder. Journal of Personality 
Disorders, 22(2), 135-147. 
Downey, G., Berenson, K., Rafaeli, E., Coifman, K., & Leventhal, N. (2011). Perceived 
rejection as a trigger for rage in borderline personality disorder. Presentation at the 
42nd International Meeting of the Society for Psychotherapy Research. Bern: 
University of Bern. 
Domes, G., Czieschnek, D., Weidler, F., Berger, C., Fast, K., & Herpertz, S. C. (2008). 
Recognition of facial affect in borderline personality disorder. Journal of Personality 
Disorder, 22(2), 135-147. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 21 
Drapeau, M., Perry, J. C., & Dunkley, D. (2008). The Cognitive Errors Rating System. 
Montréal: McGill University. 
Emond, C., Savard, K., Lalande, G., Boisvert, N., Boutin, M., & Simard, V. (2004). 
Propriétés Psychométriques de la Mesure de l’Impact (MI-45), version francophone 
du Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45.2)[Psychometric Characteristics of the OQ-45, 
French Version]. Presentation at the ACFAS Conference. Montreal. 
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Williams, J. B. W., & Gibbons, M. (2004). Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV. New York: Biometrics Research Dpt. 
Ghiassi, V., Dimaggio, G., & Brüne, M. (2010). Dysfunctions in understanding other minds in 
borderline personality disorder: A study using cartoon picture stories. Psychotherapy 
Research, 20(6), 657-667. 
Giesen-Bloo, J., & Arntz, A. (2005). World assumptions and the role of trauma in borderline 
personality disorder. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 36, 
197-208. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2011). Homo heuristicus: Why biased minds make better 
inferences. In G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, & T. Pachur (Eds.), Heuristics. The 
Foundations of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 2-27). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gilbert, P. (1998). The evolved basis and adaptive functions of cognitive distortions. British 
Journal of Medical Psychology, 71, 447-463. 
Glass, C. R., & Arnkoff, D. B. (1997). Questionnaire methods of cognitive self-statement 
assessment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 911-927. 
Greenberg, L. S. (2002). Emotion-focused therapy. Coaching clients to work through their 
feelings. Washington, D. C.: American Psychological Association. 
Gunderson, J. G., & Links, P. S. (2008). Borderline Personality Disorder: A clinical guide. 
Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Publishing Inc. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 22 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2006). A hyper-emotion theory of 
psychological illness. Psychological Review, 113(4), 822-841. 
Kendall, P. C., & Hollon, S. D. (1981). Assessing self-referent speech: Methods in the 
measurement of self-statements. In P. C. Kendall, & S. D. Hollon (Eds.), Assessment 
Strategies for Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions. New York: Academic Press. 
Kramer, U., Berger, T., Kolly, S., Marquet, P., Preisig, M., de Roten, Y., Despland, J.-N., & 
Caspar, F. (2011). Effects of motive-oriented therapeutic relationship in early-phase 
treatment of borderline personality disorder: A pilot study of a randomized trial. 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 199(4), 244-250. 
Kramer, U., Bodenmann, G., & Drapeau, M. (2009). Cognitive errors assessed by observer-
ratings in bipolar affective disorder: Relationship with symptoms and therapeutic 
alliance. The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist, 2, 92-105. 
Kramer, U., de Roten, Y., & Drapeau, M. (2011). Training effects with the observer-rated 
Cognitive Errors and Coping Action Patterns scales. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 
70(1), 41-46. 
Kramer, U., & Drapeau, M. (2009). The cognitive errors and coping action patterns in child 
molesters as assessed by external observers: A pilot study. The Open Criminology 
Journal, 2, 24-28. 
Kramer, U., & Drapeau, M. (2011). Etude de validation de la version française des échelles de 
codage du coping et des erreurs cognitives (CE-CAP) sur une population non-
clinique[Validation study of the French version of the observer-rated scales Coping 
Action Patterns and Cognitive Errors (CE-CAP) on a non-clinical population]. 
Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 169, 523-527. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 23 
Kurtz, J. E., & Morey, L. C. (1998). Negativism in evaluative judgments of words among 
depressed outpatients with borderline personality disorder. Journal of Personality 
Disorder, 12(4), 351-361. 
Leahy, R. L. (2002). Decision making and personality disorders. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 16, 209-225. 
Lecrubier, Y., Sheehan, D. V., Weiller, E., Amorim, P., Bonora, I., Harnett Sheehan, K., 
Janavs, J:, & Dunbar, G. C. (1997). The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(MINI). A short diagnostic structured interview: Reliability and validity according to 
the CIDI. European Psychiatry, 12, 224-231. 
Labouvie-Vief, G., Hakim-Larson, J., Hobart, C. J. (1987). Age, ego level and the life-span 
development of coping and defense processes. Psychological Aging, 2(3), 286-293. 
Lambert, M. J., Burlingame, G. M., Umphress, V., Hansen, N. B., Vermeersch, D. A., Clouse, 
G. C., & Yanchar, S. C. (1996). The reliability and validity of the Outcome 
Questionnaire. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 3, 249-258. 
Layden, M. A., Newman, C. F., Freeman, A., & Byers Morse, S. (1993). Cognitive Therapy 
of Borderline Personality Disorder. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Lefebvre, M. F. (1981). Cognitive distortion and cognitive errors in depressed psychiatric and 
low back pain patients. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 517-525. 
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Linehan, M. M., Bohus, M., & Lynch, T. (2007). Dialectical Behavior Therapy for pervasive 
emotion dysregulation: Theoretical and practical underpinnings. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), 
Handbook of Emotion Regulation (pp. 581-605). New York: Guilford Press. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 24 
Mergenthaler, E., & Stigler, M. (1997). Règles de transcription pour la recherche en 
psychothérapie (adaptation française) [Transcribing rules for psychotherapy research 
(French adaptation)]. Psychothérapies, 17(2), 97-103. 
Minzenberg, M. J., Poole, J. H., Vinagradov, S. (2006). Social-emotion recognition in 
borderline personality disorder. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 47, 468-474. 
Najavits, L. M., Gotthardt, S., Weiss, R., & Epstein, M. (2004). Cognitive distortions in the 
dual diagnosis of PTSD and substance use disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
28(2), 159-172. 
Napolitano, L. A., & McKay, D. (2007). Dichotomous thinking in borderline personality 
disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 31(6), 717-726. 
Nigg, J. T., Lohr, N. E., Westen, D., Gold, L. J., & Silk, K. R. (1992). Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 101(1), 61-67. 
Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than you know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259. 
Oshio, A. (2009). Development and validation of the Dichotomous Thinking Inventory. 
Social Behavior and Personality, 37(6), 729-742. 
Perry, J. C., Fowler, J. C., & Semeniuk, T. T. (2005). An investigation of tasks and techniques 
associated with dynamic interview adequacy. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 
193(2), 136-139. 
Pretzer, J. (1990). Borderline Personality Disorder. In A. T. Beck, & A. Freeman et al. (Eds.). 
Cognitive Therapy of Personality Disorders. New York: Guilford Press. 
Renneberg, B., Schmidt-Rathjens, C., Hippin, R., Backenstrauss, M., & Fydrich, T. (2005). 
Cognitive characteristics of patients with borderline personality disorder: 
Development and validation of a self-report inventory. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Expermental Psychiatry, 36, 173-182. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 25 
Sachse, R., Püschel, O., Fasbender, J., & Breil, J. (2008). Klärungsorientierte 
Schemabearbeitung. Dysfunktionale Schemata effectiv verändern [Clarification-based 
Schema-Change of Dysfunctional Schema]. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Schwartz, R. M. (1986). The internal dialogue: On the asymmetry between positive and 
negative coping thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(6), 591-605. 
Shrout, P. E., & Fleiss, J. L. (1979). Intraclass correlations: Uses in assessing rater reliability. 
Psychological Bulletin, 86(2), 420-428. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
Veen, G., & Arntz, A. (2000). Multidimensional dichotomous thinking characterizes 
borderline personality disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(1), 23-45. 
Vermeersch, D. A., Lambert, M. J., & Burlingame, G. M. (2000). Outcome Questionnaire: 
item sensitivity to change. Journal of Personality Assessment, 74(2), 242-261. 
Warwar, S. H., Links, P. S., Greenberg, L. S., & Bergmans, Y. (2008). Emotion-focused 
principles for working with borderline personality disorder. Journal of Psychiatric 
Practice, 14(2), 94-104. 
Westen, D. Lohr, N., Silk, K. R., Gold, L., & Kerber, K. (1990). Object relations and social 
cognition in borderlines, major depressives, and normals: A thematic apperception test 
analysis. Psychological Assessment, 1, 355-364. 
Whitty, M. T. (2003). Coping and defending: Age differences in maturity of defence 
mechanisms and coping strategies. Aging and Mental Health, 7(2), 123-132. 
Young, J. E. (1990). Cognitive Therapy for Personality Disorders: A Schema-Focused 
Approach. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press. 
Young, J. E., Klosko, J. S., & Weishaar, M. E. (2003). Schema Therapy. A Practitioner’s 
Guide. New York: Guilford. 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 26 
 
BIASED THINKING IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 27 
 
Table 1 
Cognitive Errors in Borderline Personality Disorder (N = 25) 
Cognitive Errors Patients Controls F (1, 49) ES 
M SD M SD 
Cognitive errors 
  Positive 
  Negative 
Positive cognitive errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Over-Generalizing 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative cognitive errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Over-Generalizing 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
2.40 
.58 
1.81 
 
.01 
.06 
.49 
.03 
 
.21 
.52 
.88 
.21 
1.32 
.57 
1.30 
 
.04 
.13 
.47 
.08 
 
.22 
.59 
.51 
.38 
1.79 
.75 
1.03 
 
.03 
.16 
.56 
.01 
 
.03 
.25 
.66 
.10 
1.10 
.63 
.76 
 
.07 
.23 
.46 
.04 
 
.06 
.21 
.70 
.14 
3.12 
1.01 
6.64* 
 
1.53 
4.06* 
.22 
.98 
 
14.51** 
4.86* 
1.59 
1.78 
.50 
.28 
.73 
 
.35 
.54 
.15 
.32 
 
1.12 
.61 
.36 
.38 
Note. MANOVA: F (8; 41) = 2.82; p = .01; ES: Effect size. All CE scores are weighted 
relative frequencies per 1000 words; Effect size (Cohen’s d) 
*p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Pearson’s correlations between symptom level (OQ-45), number of BPD criteria met and 
Cognitive Errors (N = 25) 
CE OQ-45 BPD 
Number of words 
Cognitive errors 
  Positive 
  Negative 
Positive cognitive errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Over-Generalizing 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative cognitive errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Over-Generalizing 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
-.10 
.02 
-.39 
.15 
 
-.25 
-.21 
-.33 
-.29 
 
.17 
.22 
.09 
.19 
-.11 
.31 
-.14 
.33 
 
.01 
.13 
-.13 
-.26 
 
.18 
.41* 
.18 
.26 
Note. All CE scores are weighted relative frequencies per 1000 words.  
* p < .05 
